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Presented before the Pittsburgh Tax Club, Pittsburgh—May 1970 
ONE OF T H E AREAS of tax planning in which the 1969 Tax Reform Act 
could have its greatest impact is that of compensating corporate ex-
ecutives. It seems to me that we really need to take a new look at some of 
the executive compensation patterns that have developed over the years. 
We may find many plans tailored to meet objectives no longer so impor-
tant as they once were. 
• For example, an important element of many plans has been to 
provide capital gains potential through stock options and the like. 
Perhaps we have now reached the point where the advantage of 
capital gain income as compared with ordinary income is not 
enough to offset the disadvantages of some of the plans designed 
to give capital gains potential. 
• Also, many compensation plans are designed to defer for a period 
of years or until retirement the time at which compensation in-
come is received and taxed. Here again, we may find that the ad-
vantage of doing this is not nearly so important as it once was. 
CHANGES AFFECTING FUTURE PATTERNS 
Before analyzing their effects, let us just recap briefly some of the 
1969 Act changes that will influence the future pattern of executive com-
pensation plans. 
• The most important change, in my view, is the new 50% maxi-
mum tax rate on earned income, starting in 1972. The maximum 
for 1971 is 60%. Deferred compensation is not eligible for this 
50% maximum rate. Also, the amount eligible for the maximum 
rate can be reduced by so-called tax preference items such as the 
bargain element on the exercise of stock options and the excluded 
portion of capital gains. 
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• Other changes that may directly or indirectly effect compensation 
patterns are: 
. . The maximum tax rate for capital gains over $50,000 goes 
from 25% to 35% by 1972. Thus, the rate differential 
on large capital gains, as compared with earned income is 
only 15 points as compared with a possible 45 points under 
the old law. 
. . The income-averaging rules have been liberalized. Starting 
in 1970, averaging will be permitted when the differential 
between current income and base-period income is more 
than 20%. Previously, a 33-1/3% differential was required 
before averaging could be applied. This has the effect of 
softening the tax impact upon the receipt of large amounts 
of ordinary income. 
. . When an employee receives a lump-sum distribution of bene-
fits from a qualified employee trust upon termination of em-
ployment, under the new law a portion can be taxed as ordi-
nary income rather than as capital gain. The ordinary in-
come portion will be limited to employer contributions after 
1969. There is, however, a special seven-year averaging pro-
vision, which will soften the effect of treating the lump-sum 
payment as ordinary income. 
. . The tax treatment of restricted stock plans has been changed 
quite drastically. Generally speaking, under the new law, 
property transferred to an employee becomes taxable to him 
at its full value at the time the employee's rights to the prop-
erty become nonforfeitable. The taxable value is measured 
without regard to any restrictions to which the property is 
subject unless the restriction is one that by its terms will 
never lapse. Under the general rule, the employee can no 
longer avoid reporting taxable compensation income on any 
increase in the value of the property during his period of re-
stricted ownership. Under an exception to the general rule, 
however, an employee can elect to recognize income at the 
time property is transferred to him, even though his rights 
are forfeitable. If he makes this election and the property in-
creases in value, the increase is not taxed as compensation to 
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him. The disadvantage is that the employee gets no offset-
ting deduction if he does forfeit the property. 
MAXIMUM TAX ON EARNED INCOME 
As mentioned before, I think that the provision limiting the tax rate 
on earned income to 50% is the one that will have the greatest long-range 
effect on executive compensation programs. What it will mean, I think, 
is that current cash, as a means of executive compensation, will be back 
in style. The over-all effect should be a healthy one: Executive compen-
sation programs should become simpler and companies can more readily 
reward their executives currently for the value of their current services. 
If an executive's performance in a particular year warrants a special 
bonus of say $200,000, then the company can pay this to the executive 
with the knowledge that at least half of the bonus will end up in the 
executive's pocket. I think it is important to note also that the 50% maxi-
mum tax rate effectively eliminates the government as a partner in the 
relationship between the executive and his employer. Generally speaking, 
the corporate employer's after-tax cost on the payment of executive com-
pensation is about half of the amount paid. Under the new law, the net 
after-tax yield to the employee will also be not less than 50%. Under the 
regular tax structure, where the top rate on income is 70%, there can be 
as much as a 20% net tax bite taken out of the over-all compensation 
transaction. 
One interesting sidelight here is that the new provision might add 
a new dimension to our struggles with I R S agents on the reasonableness 
of compensation. Unt i l now we have been concerned mostly with the ef-
fect of the salary disallowance on the employer's deduction. Under the 
new law we shall also have to concern ourselves with a possible addi-
tional tax to the employee if part of his salary is considered to be unrea-
sonable compensation. 
Let us get a little more specific now as to how this maximum tax on 
earned income works. The tax computation is made in three steps. As -
sume that the computation is being made for 1972 when the maximum 
rate goes to 50%. 
• First the tax is calculated on the highest amount of taxable in-
come on which the marginal rate is less than 50%. For a taxpayer 
filing a joint return this would be $52,000. 
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• Next, compute the tax at 50% on the earned income in excess of 
$52,000. The figure used here would in effect be reduced by a pro 
rata portion of the itemized deductions and exemptions. It is also 
reduced by the total of the so-called tax preference items in excess 
of $30,000. 
• The third step is to compute the tax on the remainder of the tax-
able income at the rate bracket in which it would be taxed if there 
were no limitation. 
The effect of this is that an employee can receive any amount of earned 
income and it is never taxed at a rate of more than 50%. If the individual 
happens to have a large amount of other income, however, the receipt of 
additional earned income can cause the other income to be taxed in a 
higher rate bracket. A n executive with substantial income-producing 
property may find it advantageous to transfer some of this property to 
a short-term trust to be held during the years he expects to receive large 
amounts of earned income. 
For purposes of the new rate ceilings, the term "earned income" has 
the same meaning as in section 911 (b), which relates to income from 
sources outside the U . S . It includes wages, salaries, professional fees and 
other amounts received as compensation for services actually rendered. As 
to professional fees, the entire amount of the fee is earned income even 
though part of the services are performed by employees of the taxpayer, 
provided that the taxpayer is responsible for the services performed. If 
the taxpayer is engaged in a trade or business in which both services and 
capital are material income-producing factors, the amount considered to 
be earned income cannot exceed 30% of the taxpayer's share of the pro-
fits. The regulations and the cases under section 911 seem to give us very 
little guidance as to the situations under which capital is considered to be 
a material income-producing factor. This can be very important under 
the new law because it is almost an all or nothing situation. If capital is 
not an important income-producing factor, then all the income is eligible 
for the 50% rate; on the other hand, if capital is an important factor, 
then no more than 30% of the income qualifies for the 50% rate. 
Amounts received under plans having the effect of deferring the re-
ceipt of compensation as described in section 404 are not eligible for the 
maximum rate. There is, however, a rather significant exception to this 
where the compensation is deferred subject to a substantial risk of for-
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feiture—for example, where the payment is conditioned upon the employ-
ee's remaining with the company. In these cases, if the employee receives 
the compensation by the end of the year following the year in which the 
payment became nonforfeitable, then the compensation is eligible for the 
maximum 50% rates. As you know, it's relatively common in an executive 
compensation plan for the payout to be made in instalments over a period 
of four or five years. The 50% maximum rate for these plans will apply 
as long as payment is conditioned on the employee's "earning out" the 
bonus instalments by remaining with the company. 
EFFECT ON QUALIFIED STOCK OPTIONS 
It seems to me that another effect of the 1969 Tax Reform Act may 
be to reduce very seriously the effectiveness of the qualified stock option 
as a means of compensating corporate executives. If the state of the stock 
market has not already killed the stock option, then the Tax Reform Act 
might. There are two main reasons for this: 
• For one, as mentioned before, the increase in the capital gains 
rate and the decrease in the maximum rate on earned income will 
eventually reduce the spread between the two rates to as little as 
15 points. This perhaps is not enough of a difference to offset the 
inherent disadvantages of the qualified stock option. 
• Also, under the new law, the bargain element upon the exercise 
of a qualified stock option (that is, the excess of the stock value 
at time of exercise over the price paid) is classed as a tax prefer-
ence item. If later the option stock is sold, the excluded half of 
any long-term capital gain is also a tax preference item. These 
tax-preference items are subject to a 10% minimum tax. For most 
executives, this will not be a serious problem because the amount 
subject to the minimum tax is reduced by a $30,000 exemption 
plus the federal income tax for the year. The total of these tax 
preference items, however, to the extent it exceeds $30,000, also 
reduces the amount of earned income subject to the 50% minimum 
tax rate. The impact of this on the corporate executive could be 
significant. In fact, there could be situations in which the after-
tax yield to the executive upon the exercise and sale of stock under 
a qualified stock option plan could be less than if he were to re-
ceive the equivalent in cash as ordinary income. 
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Example: 
—Corporate executive with compensation of $450,000 a year is 
granted a stock option of $300,000. 
— When he exercises the stock option, the stock is worth $500,000. 
—In year of exercise, he would have tax-preference income of 
$200,000. This would reduce his income subject to the 50% maxi-
mum by $170,000 and would cause an increase of about $34,000 
in his tax for that year. 
— Three years later, if he sells the stock for a profit of $200,000 he 
would have a tax of $65,000 on the capital gains ($12,500 on 
$50,000 and $52,500 on $150,000). H e would also have a tax-pref-
erence item of $100,000 (1/2 of $200,000), which would cause a 
further increase of $14,000 in his tax. 
— Thus his effective tax on the $200,000 bargain element in the 
stock option is $34,000 in the year of exercise, plus $65,000 and 
$14,000 in year of sale or a total of $113,000—an effective rate of 
about 57%. 
— This of course is more than the 50% tax that would be payable if 
the $200,000 had been paid in cash. Additionally, the executive 
has been required to put $300,000 at risk for at least three years. 
Hi s interest cost for financing the stock purchase for the three-
year period would in most cases be substantially more than the 
stock would yield in dividends. 
— A d d to this the fact that the company must give up its tax deduc-
tion in order to allow long-term capital gain treatment of the ex-
ecutive and it is difficult to see the advantage of continuing a 
qualified stock option program on anything like the scale on 
which they have been used in the past. 
In my view, the over-all effect of the Tax Reform Act has been to 
limit seriously the value of the qualified stock option as an executive 
compensation tool. Also, the Act very seriously reduces the effectiveness 
of the so-called restricted stock plans, which had become so popular in 
the last few years. I do not think it is a complete answer to say that the 
alternative to these stock plans is to give the executive more cash. Plans 
providing for only current cash payments seem to me to lack one element 
that is important to attract and retain competent top-level executives. 
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This element is the knowledge on the part of the executive that as he suc-
ceeds and as the company prospers, he will be able to build a substantial 
estate for himself and his family. Even with the government's tax-take 
limited to 50%, it would seem to me very difficult to devise a system of 
cash bonuses which will give the executive the feeling that the growth 
of his personal wealth will be tied into the growth in the compa-
ny's value under his guidance. 
NON-QUALIFIED STOCK OPTIONS 
Now that the Tax Reform Act has dulled some of the glamour of the 
qualified stock option, we are likely to see an increased use of non-quali-
fied stock options by corporate employers. The terms of non-qualified 
options need not fit into the restrictive requirements of the Internal Reve-
nue Code; this gives corporations more flexibility in setting the terms of 
the options to meet the needs and objectives of both the corporation and 
its executives. 
Generally speaking, an executive is taxed at ordinary income tax 
rates on the spread between the option price and the value of the stock at 
the date the option is exercised. The income taxed to the executive would, 
in most cases, qualify for the 50% maximum tax rates and will not be 
treated as tax-preference income. The corporation will be entitled to de-
duct, in its return, the same amount that is taxed to the executive. Under 
a non-qualified plan, the corporation can often make the terms of the 
award more attractive to the executive by structuring the plan to pass all 
or part of the corporate tax benefit along to the executive. 
PHANTOM STOCK PLANS 
Another possible way of giving the executive the ability to build an 
estate is through some version of the so-called phantom stock plans, 
which in the past have achieved only limited popularity. Under these 
plans, the executive is credited with units, the value of which is related 
to hypothetical shares of the company's stock. As the value of the com-
pany's stock increases, the value of the hypothetical shares credited to 
the executive also increases. Ultimately an amount equivalent to the ap-
preciation in the value of the hypothetical shares is paid out to the exec-
utive ; payment is often made over a period of years after retirement. The 
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executive is taxed at ordinary income rates on these payments, but since 
the payments are often received after retirement, the tax burden is not so 
great. The employer can deduct the payments as compensation at the 
time they are made. So far as I can tell, the Tax Reform Act wi l l have 
little or no effect on the tax status of this type of plan. So long as the ex-
ecutive's rights to receive compensation are forfeitable when credited to 
his account and so long as the obligation to the executive is not set aside 
in a separate fund and thereby insulated from the claims of creditors, 
the executive should not be subject to tax on the compensation until he 
receives the payments. The payments to the executive will probably not 
qualify for the 50% maximum rate, but this should not normally be a 
significant disadvantage once the executive has retired. 
One of the major disadvantages of this type of plan to the executive 
is that he has no tangible evidence of the value of his right to receive 
compensation. He assumes the risk that the employer will be able to pay 
the compensation when it is due. 
AN EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION TECHNIQUE 
Just recently I have been thinking about another executive compen-
sation technique that might offer a way of giving the corporate executive 
an estate-building potential without exposing him to the risks and other 
disadvantages of a qualified stock option plan. I have been considering 
the possibility of a company's creating a new issue of convertible pre-
ferred stock especially for use in paying compensation to its executives. 
A s an example, assume a convertible preferred stock which is re-
deemable and callable at $50 a share after fifteen years and which pays 
an annual dividend of 50 cents a share. Assume that each share is con-
vertible into four shares of common after five years and that the common 
stock is selling for $15 a share. The preferred stock could be non-trans-
ferable and could be subject to sale back to the company at a reduced 
amount if the executive terminates employment before a specified period 
of time. 
Let us assume that the company obtains expert opinion that the fair 
market value of this stock is equal to $35 a share. The investment value 
of a 50 cent redeemable preferred stock to yield 8% for fifteen years might 
be about $20 a share. For illustration purposes, I have assumed that the 
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conversion privilege would add another $15 in value. The conversion 
terms could be altered to arrive at whatever value was desired. 
Assume that a particular executive received as a bonus 200 shares of 
this stock, and it is valued at $7,000 without regard to the restrictions. 
Under the restricted stock provisions of the Tax Reform Act (sec-
tion 83b), he could elect to include this $7,000 in income immediately 
and the maximum tax he would pay on it would be $3,500. Let us say 
that this executive performed well, the company prospered, and after five 
years the market value of the common stock had increased from $15 to 
$40 a share. He could convert his 200 shares of preferred into 800 shares 
of common worth $32,000. He has a potential capital gain of $25,000 and 
he has developed an asset of $32,000 for his estate at a tax cost of no more 
than $3,500. 
On the other hand, if the value of the common stock remained rela-
tively stagnant, the executive could redeem his stock for $10,000 after 
fifteen years. The executive is subject to very little downside risk, while 
the potential on the upside is unlimited. The executive is also freed from 
the financing burdens of a stock option plan, and the only exposure to tax 
preference income would be on the 50% capital gains exclusion if the 
stock was sold. 
CONCLUSION 
To conclude, I think that the provisions of Tax Reform Act relating 
to executive compensation offer some very interesting possibilities for the 
tax planner to explore. The new rules, it seems to me, lend themselves 
more readily than the old rules to the development of a plan offering 
realistic after-tax rewards to the successful executive. 
